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WITNESS HISTORY AS JURIES BECOME 
HISTORY: HOW THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
ALLOWED THE OPINIONS OF LAY 
WITNESSES TO OVERTAKE THE DUTY OF 
THE JURY IN UNITED STATES v. JAYYOUSI 
Abstract: On September 19, 2011, in United States v. Jayyousi, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that an FBI agent’s testi-
mony regarding his post-hoc review of investigation materials was admis-
sible as lay opinion testimony under Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit joined a minority of courts in 
adopting the most liberal interpretation of the Rule 701 perception and 
helpfulness requirements. This Comment argues that the Eleventh Cir-
cuit erred in adopting the most liberal interpretation of Rule 701 and 
that only by adopting the strictest interpretation can the courts continue 
to show due reverence for our jurors. 
Introduction 
 The right to a trial by jury is fundamental to the American justice 
system.1 So, too, is the right to confront one’s witnesses and obtain wit-
nesses in one’s favor.2 But cases involving the admissibility of opinion 
testimony by lay witnesses under Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence require the courts to determine which of these two revered prin-
ciples should prevail.3 In 2011, in United States v. Jayyousi, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of Florida did not abuse its discretion in allowing 
                                                                                                                      
1 See U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed . . . .”); U.S. Const. amend. VII (“In Suits at common 
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury 
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court 
of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”). 
2 See U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .”). 
3 See Fed. R. Evid. 701; infra notes 64–87 and accompanying text (discussing how more 
liberal interpretations of Rule 701 limit the autonomy of the jury to draw its own conclu-
sions). 
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a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent to testify as a lay witness.4 
In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit aligned itself with those circuits that 
endorse a liberal interpretation of Rule 701, choosing the right to pre-
sent witnesses over the right to have juries decide cases with autonomy.5 
 This Comment evaluates the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Jayyousi 
in light of the alternate interpretations of Rule 701 prevalent in other 
circuits.6 It further considers how the holding in Jayyousi affects the 
rule’s purposes.7 Part I gives an overview of the opinion testimony at 
issue in Jayyousi and summarizes the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling.8 Part II 
contextualizes Jayyousi’s holding within the broader circuit court debate 
on the requirements of Rule 701.9 Finally, Part III argues that by loosen-
ing the standard for which a witness satisfies Rule 701, the Eleventh 
Circuit has encroached upon the preeminent autonomy of the jury.10 
I. Jayyousi: The Eleventh Circuit Interprets Rule 701 
 On April 16, 2007, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida, three defendants—Kifah Jayyousi, Adham Hassoun, and 
Jose Padilla—faced charges relating to their alleged support for Islamist 
violence overseas.11 The defendants maintained that their actions from 
October 1993 to November 2001 amounted to nothing more than 
providing humanitarian aid to oppressed Muslims.12 The government, 
however, contended that the defendants formed a support cell and 
conspired to send money, recruits, and equipment overseas to groups 
that were known to use violence to further radical Islamist beliefs.13 
                                                                                                                      
4 United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1104 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
29 ( June 25, 2012) (No. 11-1194). 
5 See id.; infra notes 40–46 and accompanying text (discussing the most liberal inter-
pretation of Rule 701, adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in Jayyousi and followed by the Fifth 
and Tenth Circuits). 
6 See infra notes 34–96 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 34–96 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 11–33 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 34–67 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 68–96 and accompanying text. 
11 Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1091. The defendants were charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 956(a)(1) and 2339(A). Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1091; see 18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(1) (2006) 
(“Whoever, within the jurisdiction of the United States, conspires . . . to commit at any 
place outside the United States . . . the offense of murder, kidnapping, or maiming . . . 
shall . . . be punished . . . .”); id. § 2339A(a) (“[W]hoever provides material support or 
resources . . . knowing or intending that they are used in preparation for, or in carrying 
out, a violation of . . . § 956 . . . .”). 
12 Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1093. 
13 Id. at 1092. 
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 To support its theory, the government used intercepted telephone 
calls between defendants, faxes between Islamist support groups and 
the defendants, and financial records.14 During the trial, the jurors 
were provided with binders containing the English translation of each 
intercepted phone call, along with the speakers and date of each call.15 
The government supplemented these documents with testimony from 
numerous FBI language specialists and FBI agents.16 
 Over the defendants’ objections, the government called FBI agent 
John Kavanaugh as a lay witness to help interpret the intercepted tele-
phone calls and the defendants’ possible use of code words.17 In May 
2002, following the defendants’ arrests, Kavanaugh was assigned to the 
defendants’ case.18 Kavanaugh’s primary assignment was to review pre-
collected phone calls to discern which calls needed transcribing.19 
Many of the calls required translation into English first, which was done 
by another FBI agent, as Kavanaugh neither spoke nor read Arabic.20 
Based on his experience in the defendants’ case and his previous in-
volvement in twenty terrorist-related cases, Kavanaugh testified that he 
believed the defendants were using code words within their communi-
cations.21 Kavanaugh opined that the defendants used “football” and 
“soccer” as code for jihad, “sneakers” for support, “going on a picnic” 
for travel to jihad, and “married” for martyrdom, among other pro-
posed code words.22 At the end of a four-month trial, the jury found the 
defendants guilty.23 
 The defendants appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that the 
district court had abused its discretion in allowing Kavanaugh’s opinion 
testimony.24 The defendants argued that the Kavanaugh’s testimony 
failed to satisfy the three requirements of Rule 701 of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.25 For opinion testimony from a lay witness to be admissi-
                                                                                                                      
14 Id. at 1093. 
15 Id. at 1122 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
16 Id. at 1093–96 (majority opinion). 
17 Id. at 1095. The term “lay witness” describes a witness providing testimony that is 
governed by Rule 701, as distinct from an “expert witness” who provides testimony gov-
erned by Rule 702. See Fed. R. Evid. 701; Fed. R. Evid. 702; infra note 26 and accompany-
ing text. 
18 Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1095. 
19 Id. at 1095; id. at 1122 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
20 Id. at 1122 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
21 Id. at 1095 (majority opinion). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 1091–92. 
24 Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102. 
25 Id. at 1102; see Fed. R. Evid. 701. 
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ble, Rule 701 mandates that the testimony be (a) “rationally based on 
the witness’s perception”; (b) “helpful to clearly understanding the 
witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue”; and (c) “not 
based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within 
the scope of Rule 702.”26 Accordingly, the defendants argued that Ka-
vanaugh’s testimony was not “rationally based on the witness’s percep-
tion” because he was not present during any of the intercepted phone 
calls.27 Further, the defendants posited that Kavanaugh’s testimony was 
not “helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to de-
termining a fact in issue” because Kavanaugh based his testimony on 
documents admitted into evidence.28 
 In its decision, the Eleventh Circuit held that Rule 701 was satisfied 
pursuant to the court’s interpretation of the Rule’s requirements and, 
thus, the district court had not abused its discretion in allowing Ka-
vanaugh to testify as a lay witness.29 The court reasoned that a lay wit-
ness could base opinion testimony strictly on review of documents even 
when the witness neither participated in nor observed in real time the 
activity about which he testified.30 First, the court noted that Rule 
                                                                                                                      
26 Fed. R. Evid. 701. Rule 701 governs opinion testimony when the “witness is not testi-
fying as an expert.” Id. Conversely, Rule 702 governs expert testimony. Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
Rule 702 provides: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the 
expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) 
the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the 
product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably 
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 
Id. 
27 Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102; see Fed. R. Evid. 701(a). 
28 Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102, 1103; see Fed. R. Evid. 701(b). 
29 Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1104; see Fed. R. Evid. 701. 
30 Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102. The court cited to both United States v. Hamaker and United 
States v. Gold to support  its holding that a lay witness could base opinion testimony strictly 
on review of pre-recorded and pre-collected documents. Id. (citing United States v. 
Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2006) and United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 
817 (11th Cir. 1984)). In 2006, in Hamaker, the Eleventh Circuit held that a financial ana-
lyst who “simply reviewed and summarized over seven thousand financial documents” was 
properly admitted as a lay witness under Rule 701. 455 F.3d at 1331–32; see Fed. R. Evid. 
701. The court reasoned that the testimony proffered by the financial analyst regarding his 
experience in analyzing the defendants’ financial records satisfied Rule 701(a). Hamaker, 
455 F.3d at 1331–32; see Fed. R. Evid. 701(a). In 1984, in Gold, the Eleventh Circuit held 
that a president of a large eyewear company was properly admitted as a lay witness under 
Rule 701 to testify that the volume of eyewear sales at another large eyewear company was 
excessive. 743 F.2d at 817; see Fed. R. Evid. 701(a). 
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701(a) was satisfied because the testimony proffered by Kavanaugh was 
based on his review of the investigation’s documents and was thus “ra-
tionally based on [his] perception.”31 Second, the court reasoned that 
the “helpful” requirement of Rule 701(b) was satisfied because the jury 
was unfamiliar with the complexities of terrorism activities and the de-
fendants’ phone calls would not be “perfectly clear” without Ka-
vanaugh’s testimony.32 Third, the court stated that Rule 701(c) was sat-
isfied because Kavanaugh based his testimony strictly on his experience 
on the defendants’ case, and it therefore was not based on “scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 
702.”33 
II. Rule 701: Three Conflicting Interpretations  
Among Circuit Courts 
 In deciding Jayyousi, the Eleventh Circuit joined a growing circuit 
split in which all but two circuits have chosen to follow one of three in-
terpretations of Rule 701’s requirements.34 Although the circuits have 
disagreed on the proper application of the rule, they agree on its twin 
aims: to provide the jury with only necessary information from those 
whose experiences qualify them to share, and to protect the rightful 
domain of the jury to draw its own conclusions.35 
                                                                                                                      
31 Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103; see Fed. R. Evid. 701(a). 
32 Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103 (quoting United States v. Awan, 966 F.2d 1415, 1430–31 
(11th Cir. 1992)). In holding that Kavanaugh’s testimony was admissible because the de-
fendants’ phone calls would not be “perfectly clear” without the testimony, the Eleventh 
Circuit relied upon United States v. Awan. Id. In 1992, in Awan, the Eleventh Circuit held 
that an undercover agent was permitted to testify on the meaning of code words within a 
recorded conversation of which he was a member. 966 F.2d at 1430–31. The court rea-
soned that the code words were not “perfectly clear” without the agent’s testimony, and 
thus his testimony was “helpful to a clear understanding” under Rule 701(b). Id.; see Fed. 
R. Evid. 701(b). 
33 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(c); Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103–04. 
34 See infra notes 37–67 and accompanying text. Only the Sixth Circuit and the District 
of Columbia Circuit have not weighed in on this issue. See United States v. Jayyousi, 657 
F.3d 1085, 1102 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 29 ( June 25, 2012) (No. 11-1194); 
United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 513–15 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Johnson, 
617 F.3d 286, 293 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 831–32 (7th Cir. 
2008); Hirst v. Inverness Hotel Corp., 544 F.3d 221, 225–27 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 906 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d 1213, 
1222–23 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 156 (4th Cir. 2006); Unit-
ed States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 212–15 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 
630, 640–41 (8th Cir. 2001); Keller v. United States, 38 F.3d 16, 31 (1st Cir. 1994); United 
States v. LaPierre, 998 F.2d 1460, 1465 (9th Cir. 1993). 
35 See Fed. R. Evid. 701; Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102; Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d at 1222–23; 
LaPierre, 998 F.2d at 1465; Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory committee’s note. The advisory 
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 This Part demonstrates how the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation 
of Rule 701 is the only reading in which Kavanaugh’s opinion testimony 
as a lay witness would be admissible.36 Section A discusses the most lib-
eral interpretation of Rule 701, adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in 
Jayyousi and followed in the Fifth and Tenth Circuits.37 Section B dis-
cusses a stricter approach to interpreting Rule 701, adopted by the Sev-
enth and Ninth Circuits.38 Finally, Section C addresses the strictest in-
terpretation of Rule 701, adopted by the First, Second, Third, Fourth, 
and Eighth Circuits.39 
A. The Jayyousi Approach: A Liberal Interpretation of Rule 701 
 With its decision in Jayyousi, the Eleventh Circuit joined the Fifth 
and Tenth Circuits in adopting the most liberal interpretation of the 
Rule 701(a) requirement that lay testimony be “rationally based on the 
witness’s perception.”40 These circuits have held that an agent’s partici-
                                                                                                                      
committee’s note to Rule 701 explains that the limitation within 701(a) is the “familiar 
requirement of first-hand knowledge or observation.” Fed. R. Evid. 701(b) advisory commit-
tee’s note (emphasis added). The note also explains that the limitation within 701(b) is 
such that the testimony is “helpful in resolving issues.” Id. The advisory committee note 
further asserts that if “attempts are made to introduce meaningless assertions which 
amount to little more than choosing up sides, exclusion for lack of helpfulness is called for 
by [701(b)].” Id.; see also Anne Bowen Poulin, Experience-Based Opinion Testimony: Strengthen-
ing the Lay Opinion Rule, 39 Pepp. L. Rev. 551, 562–65 (2012) (explaining the requirements 
and the application of Rule 701). Learned Hand articulated the twin aims of allowing 
opinion witnesses: 
The Verdict of a Jury and Evidence of a Witness are very different things, in 
the truth and falsehood of them; a Witness swears but to what he hath heard 
or seen, generally or more largely, to what hath fallen under his senses. But a 
Juryman swears to what he can inferr and conclude from the Testimony of 
such Witnesses by the act and force of the Understanding, to be the Fact in-
quired after . . . . The distinction cannot be put more plainly. 
Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 Harv. L. 
Rev. 40, 44–45 (1901) (quoting Bushell’s Case, [1670] 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.) 1009) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see Poulin, supra, at 557 n.11. 
36 See Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103–04; infra notes 37–67 and accompanying text. This 
Comment designates the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 701 as the most “liberal” 
in that its interpretation is the only one that would allow lay testimony from a witness who 
had no real-time observation of the subject matter, thus allowing more lay testimony as 
compared to other circuits. See Fed. R. Evid. 701; Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103–04; infra notes 
37–67 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 40–46 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 47–56 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 57–67 and accompanying text. 
40 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(a); Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102–03; El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 513–15; 
Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d at 1221–22. 
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pation in an investigation, even when such participation consists of en-
tirely post-hoc review of pre-collected information, is sufficient to satisfy 
the perception requirement of Rule 701(a).41 Thus, when a witness 
draws on his or her experience within such an investigation to form 
opinions, this fulfills the 701(a) requirement that opinions be “rational-
ly based on the witness’s perception.”42 
 Furthermore, these circuits have established a very low threshold 
to fulfill the Rule 701(b) “helpful” requirement.43 These courts have 
held that Rule 701(b) is satisfied even when the parties provide the ju-
ries with all the relevant recorded information and transcripts about 
which the witness is opining.44 As such, even when the jury seems to 
have the same resources as the witness to determine the significance of 
evidence, these circuits have determined that such testimony is still 
helpful when the subject would not otherwise be “perfectly clear” to 
the jury.45 Additionally, these circuits have held that allowing such tes-
timony does not amount to “little more than choosing up sides” as pro-
hibited by the advisory committee notes to Rule 701(b).46 
B. The Middle-of-the-Road Approach: A Stricter Interpretation of Helpful 
Requiring “First-Hand” Knowledge 
 As compared to the court in Jayyousi, the Seventh and the Ninth 
Circuit Courts have applied a stricter interpretation to the Rule 701 
                                                                                                                      
41 See El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 513–14 (holding that FBI agents’ lay testimony based solely 
on their after-the-fact experiences from investigating wiretapped conversations and previ-
ously recorded videos satisfied Rule 701(a)); Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102–03 (holding that an 
FBI agent’s review of the transcripts of pre-recorded and pre-collected phone calls satisfied 
Rule 701(a)); Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d at 1215–16, 1221 (holding that an FBI agent’s lay tes-
timony based solely on his studying of video recordings multiple times satisfied Rule 
701(a) and allowed him to testify on the visual identification of the defendant). 
42 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(a); El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 514; Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102–03; 
Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d at 1221. 
43 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(b); Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103–04; Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d at 1222. 
44 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(b); Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103; Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d at 1222 
(holding that an FBI agent’s testimony, opining that the defendant appeared in a video 
recording, was “helpful” under 701(b) despite the fact that the same video recording was 
played before the jury and the jury was able to see the defendant in court throughout the 
trial). 
45 See Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103  (“We have held that a lay witness may provide interpre-
tations of code words when the meaning of these words ‘[is] not ‘perfectly clear’ without 
[the witness’s] explanations’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Awan, 966 
F.2d 1415, 1430–31 (11th Cir. 1992))); Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d at 1222. 
46 Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory committee’s note; see Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103; Zepeda-
Lopez, 478 F.3d at 1222. 
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requirements.47 These circuits interpret Rule 701(a) to allow witnesses 
to testify based on knowledge discerned from post-hoc review of pre-
recorded information only when the witness can couple such review 
with some first-hand observation of the subject.48 The witness can only 
satisfy the requisite 701(a) perception requirement of “first-hand 
knowledge or observation” when the witness had some personal obser-
vations to supplement the witness’s general perceptions derived during 
the investigation period.49 
 Additionally, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have applied a stricter 
interpretation of the 701(b) requirement than that of the court in 
Jayyousi.50 Both circuits have held that in order for a witness’s testimony 
to satisfy Rule 701(b), the witness cannot opine on the meaning of 
clear statements or matters that are within the jurors’ abilities to de-
termine for themselves.51 The Ninth Circuit in particular has reasoned 
that to allow a witness to opine on these matters would invade the role 
                                                                                                                      
47 Compare Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102–03 (11th Cir.), with Rollins, 544 F.3d at 831–32 
(7th Cir.), and Freeman, 498 F.3d at 906 (9th Cir.). 
48 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(a); Rollins, 544 F.3d at 831–33 (holding that an FBI agent’s lay 
testimony about code words within defendants’ phone calls satisfied Rule 701 because it 
was rationally based on both his real-time listening of intercepted phone calls and surveil-
lance of defendants, as well as his personal and long-standing experience on the investiga-
tion); Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904–05 (holding that a Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) agent’s lay testimony about drugs and drug-dealing satisfied Rule 701 because it was 
rationally based on both his real-time surveillance during the investigation as well as his 
interpretations of pre-recorded conversations). 
49 Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory committee’s note; see Fed. R. Evid. 701(a); Rollins, 544 
F.3d at 831–33; Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904–05. 
50 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(b); Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103; Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904–05; 
United States v. LaPierre, 998 F.2d 1460, 1465 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jackson, 688 
F.2d 1121, 1124–26 (7th Cir. 1982). 
51 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(b); LaPierre, 998 F.2d at 1465 (holding that a police officer’s 
testimony in identifying the defendant in a surveillance photo was not helpful to the jury 
as the officer’s knowledge of the defendant was based entirely on review of the photos and, 
therefore, the jury was equally equipped to make an independent determination on 
whether the defendant was in the photos); Jackson, 688 F.2d at 1123, 1125–26 (holding that 
a witness’s identification of the defendant in surveillance photos was helpful to the jury 
because the witness had previous encounters with the defendant and positively identified 
the defendant from the surveillance photos prior to his arrest). For example, in United 
States v. Freeman, the Ninth Circuit held that a Los Angeles Police Department detective’s 
testimony was helpful to the jury in its interpretation of otherwise ambiguous statements, 
but it determined that the detective’s repetition of and speculation on clear statements 
were inadmissible. 498 F.3d at 904–05. Specifically, the court determined that the detec-
tive’s testimony, in which he stated that the defendant’s statement of, “I’m going to bring 
that to you” was regarding money, was admissible because the original statement was am-
biguous; conversely, the detective’s testimony interpreting “particulars” to mean “details” 
was inadmissible because it was interpreting a clear statement. Id. 
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of the jury by forcing the determination of liability to come from the 
witness stand rather than the jury box.52 
 Analyzing Jayyousi under this stricter interpretation, Kavanaugh’s 
testimony would fail to satisfy both 701(a) and 701(b).53 Kavanaugh 
based his testimony exclusively on post-hoc review of pre-recorded in-
formation and had no corresponding experience of “first-hand 
knowledge or observation” as required by these circuits.54 In Ka-
vanaugh’s testimony, he opined on the meaning of phone calls, tran-
scripts of which were provided to the jury.55 Given that jurors had the 
same resources and abilities as Kavanaugh to determine for themselves 
if the defendants were using code words, Kavanaugh’s testimony would 
fail to satisfy Rule 701(b) under this stricter interpretation.56 
C. The Strictest Approach: Tightening the Interpretation of Rule 701 
 The majority of circuit courts—the First, Second, Third, Fourth, 
and Eighth Circuits—apply the strictest approach of Rule 701.57 These 
circuits have reasoned that Rule 701(a) can only be satisfied when the 
witness has participated in or observed the subject of his testimony in 
real time.58 As such, these circuits follow the reasoning that “post-hoc 
                                                                                                                      
52 LaPierre, 998 F.2d at 1465; see Fed. R. Evid. 701(b). 
53 See Fed. R. Evid. 701; Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102–03; Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904–05; Jack-
son, 688 F.2d at 1124–26. 
54 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(a); Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102–03; Rollins, 544 F.3d at 831–32; 
Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904–05; Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory committee’s note. 
55 Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1122 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
56 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(b); Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103–04 (majority opinion); Freeman, 
498 F.3d at 904–05; LaPierre, 998 F.2d at 1465; Jackson, 688 F.2d at 1124–26. 
57 See Fed. R. Evid. 701; Johnson, 617 F.3d at 293 (4th Cir.); Hirst, 544 F.3d at 225–27 
(3d Cir.); Perkins, 470 F.3d at 156 (4th Cir.); Garcia, 413 F.3d at 212–15 (2d Cir.); Peoples, 
250 F.3d at 640–41 (8th Cir.); Keller, 38 F.3d at 31 (1st Cir.). 
58 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(a); Johnson, 617 F.3d at 293 (holding that an agent’s lay testimony 
was not admissible under Rule 701(a) because his opinion about intercepted phone calls was 
based on after-the-fact interviews he had with suspects); Hirst, 544 F.3d at 226 (holding that a 
security guard employer’s testimony was not admissible under Rule 701(a) because he did 
not witness the event first-hand and only drew on second-hand information and unrelated 
experiences); Perkins, 470 F.3d at 153–54, 156 (holding that the testimonies of two police 
officers who observed the defendant kicking a citizen in real time were admissible under 
Rule 701(a), but the testimonies of two other officers who were not present and were only 
relying on the original officers’ details were inadmissible under Rule 701(a)); Garcia, 413 
F.3d at 212–13 (holding that a DEA agent’s lay testimony was not admissible under Rule 
701(a) because his opinion was not limited to his own personal observations, as he drew on 
the totality of the investigation as observed and reported by all agents participating in the 
investigation); Peoples, 250 F.3d at 640–41 (holding that an FBI agent’s lay testimony was not 
admissible under Rule 701(a) because her opinions were based entirely on after-the-fact re-
view of recorded conversations and, therefore, she had no real first-hand perception of the 
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assessments cannot be credited as a substitute for the personal 
knowledge and perception required under Rule 701.”59 Thus, these 
circuits have reasoned that the “perception” upon which a witness can 
draw, under Rule 701(a), cannot be based on the totality of the investi-
gation after the fact.60 Instead, these circuits interpret Rule 701(a) to 
allow the witness to testify only on the witness’s original observation of 
the facts as they occurred.61 
 Additionally, these circuits interpret that Rule 701(b) is only satis-
fied when the testimony addresses an opinion on an area of fact or 
knowledge that the jurors would not be able to discern for them-
selves.62 As such, these circuits interpret Rule 701(b) to mean that a lay 
witness cannot testify on an issue or opinion that the jury is fully capa-
ble of extracting from the evidence itself.63 These circuits have held 
that to allow a lay witness to testify in this situation would not be “help-
ful” under Rule 701(b) but would, instead, disrupt the autonomy of the 
jury by essentially telling the jury the decision it should reach.64 
 Analyzing Jayyousi under the strictest interpretation, Kavanaugh’s 
testimony would fail to satisfy the Rule 701 requirements.65 Ka-
vanaugh’s testimony would clearly fail to satisfy Rule 701(a) because he 
did not observe any of the defendants’ conversations in real time and 
only read translated transcripts of phone calls years after they oc-
curred.66 Further, Kavanagh’s testimony would fail to satisfy Rule 
                                                                                                                      
facts); Keller, 38 F.3d at 31 (holding that a witness’s lay testimony regarding a longshoreman’s 
accident was not admissible under Rule 701(a) because the witness did not see or hear the 
accident and based testimony only on inferences). 
59 Johnson, 617 F.3d at 293; see Fed. R. Evid. 701(a); Hirst, 544 F.3d at 226; Garcia, 413 
F.3d at 212–13; Peoples, 250 F.3d at 641. 
60 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(a); Johnson, 617 F.3d at 293; Garcia, 413 F.3d at 212–13; Peoples, 
250 F.3d at 641. 
61 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(a); Johnson, 617 F.3d at 293; Garcia, 413 F.3d at 212–13; Peoples, 
250 F.3d at 641. 
62 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(b); Hirst, 544 F.3d at 227; Garcia, 413 F.3d at 215; United States 
v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 750–51 (2d Cir. 2004); Peoples, 250 F.3d at 641–42. 
63 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(b); Hirst, 544 F.3d at 226 (holding that an employer’s testimo-
ny relating to the probability of an event happening “provided the jury with little more 
than a self-serving, conclusory opinion as to what result it should ultimately reach”); Gri-
nage, 390 F.3d at 750–51 (holding that a case agent’s interpretation of the defendant’s 
phone calls, which were played for the jury and described as “common sense” interpreta-
tions by the government, amounted to summary testimony that, “rather than being helpful 
to the jury, . . . usurped the jury’s function”). 
64 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(b); Hirst, 544 F.3d at 226–27; Grinage, 390 F.3d at 750–51. 
65 See Fed. R. Evid. 701; Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103–04; Johnson, 617 F.3d at 293; Garcia, 
413 F.3d at 212–13; Peoples, 250 F.3d at 640–41. 
66 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(a); Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1122 (Barkett, J., dissenting); Johnson, 
617 F.3d at 293; Garcia, 413 F.3d at 212–13; Peoples, 250 F.3d at 640–41. 
2013] United States v. Jayyousi's Overly Liberal Interpretation of Rule 701 155 
701(b) because he interpreted the same transcripts that the jury was 
able to scrutinize, and therefore did not address an area of fact or 
knowledge that the jury was not able to obtain on its own.67 
III. Jayyousi and Rule 701: The Eleventh Circuit  
Frustrates the Jury’s Autonomy 
 By adopting the most liberal interpretation of Rule 701 the Elev-
enth Circuit in Jayyousi improperly interfered with the autonomy of the 
jury to reach its own conclusions.68 Under the alternative interpreta-
tions of Rule 701, Kavanaugh’s testimony would not have been admissi-
ble as lay witness testimony given his lack of personal participation and 
experience with the defendants’ activities.69 As such, the majority of 
circuits only would have allowed Kavanaugh to testify if the government 
could satisfy the expert witness requirements under Rule 702.70 Given 
the persuasiveness of expert testimony, its requirements are more diffi-
cult to satisfy.71 Rule 702, therefore, mandates that such testimony must 
be the product of “reliable principles or methods.”72 As such, the 
Jayyousi court should not have allowed the government to skirt the 
tougher expert witness requirements of Rule 702 by admitting Ka-
vanaugh as a lay witness under Rule 701.73 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit 
                                                                                                                      
67 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(b); Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1122 (Barkett, J., dissenting); Hirst, 544 
F.3d at 226–27; Grinage, 390 F.3d at 750–51. 
68 See Fed. R. Evid. 701; United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1103–04 (11th Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 29 ( June 25, 2012) (No. 11-1194). 
69 See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text; supra notes 65–67 and accompanying 
text. 
70 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(c); Fed. R. Evid. 702; supra notes 53–56 and accompanying 
text; supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
71 See Fed. R. Evid. 701; Fed. R. Evid. 702; Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory committee’s note; 
Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note; see also Kenneth Broun et al., McCormick on 
Evidence §§ 13–18 (6th ed. 2006) [hereinafter McCormick on Evidence] (describing gen-
erally the strict requirements of admissibility for expert testimony under Rule 702, particular-
ly in comparison to the requirements of admissibility for lay opinion testimony under Rule 
701). 
72 See Fed. R. Evid. 702; Fed. R. Evid. 701 committee’s note on 2000 amendment; 
McCormick on Evidence, supra note 71, § 13; see also Poulin, supra note 35, at 577 (ex-
plaining the “advantage of deference” a party may obtain by designating a witness as an 
“expert witness” rather than as a “lay witness”). 
73 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(c); Fed. R. Evid. 702; Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102–05. Arguably, 
the court’s decision in Jayyousi was contrary to the purpose of Rule 701, which attempts to 
prevent parties from offering would-be experts as lay witnesses to avoid satisfying the more 
stringent expert witness admissibility requirements under Rule 702. See Fed. R. Evid. 701 
committee’s note on 2000 amendment (stating that “Rule 701 has been amended to elim-
inate the risk that the reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded through 
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should have followed the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Cir-
cuits and applied a stricter interpretation to Rule 701 that would have 
protected against this danger to the jury.74 
 Allowing a would-be expert witness to testify under the guise of a 
lay witness can be particularly dangerous to the autonomy of the jury.75 
Expert testimony is limited, by Rule 702, to experts with “scientific, 
technical, or some other specialized knowledge” who base their testi-
mony on “sufficient facts or data” and apply “reliable principles and 
methods” to those facts.76 Given society’s reverence for experts, a jury 
can be improperly swayed to agree with expert witnesses’ opinions ra-
ther than decide an issue for themselves.77 This reliance on expert 
opinion is permitted, given the understanding that, under Rule 702, 
the expert witness is testifying on an issue that the jury is unequipped 
to discern for themselves.78 In Jayyousi, however, Kavanaugh’s opinion 
was admitted as lay opinion testimony under Rule 701 and, therefore, 
without the Rule 702 safeguard that his testimony be based on “reliable 
principles and methods.”79 Rather than forcing the government to sat-
isfy the expert witness requirements of Rule 702, the Eleventh Circuit 
interpreted the Rule 701 requirements in a way that allowed Kavanaugh 
to testify as a lay witness.80 In so doing, the Eleventh Circuit effectively 
allowed an expert witness to testify without fulfilling any of Rule 702’s 
protective admissibility requirements.81 
 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit’s liberal interpretation of the 
Rule 701(a) “perception” requirement, which allows witnesses like Ka-
                                                                                                                      
the simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing”); McCormick on 
Evidence, supra note 71, § 13. 
74 See Fed. R. Evid. 701; Fed. R. Evid. 702; Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1104; see also supra notes 
57–67 and accompanying text (explaining these circuits’ approach). 
75 See United States v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 750–51 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 641–42 (8th Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Evid. 701 committee’s note on 2000 
amendment. 
76 See Fed. R. Evid. 702; Ellen Melville, Comment, Gating the Gatekeeper: Tamraz v. Lincoln 
Electric Co. and the Expansion of Daubert Reviewing Authority, 53 B.C L. Rev. E. Supp. 195, 199–
202 (2012), http://bclawreview.org/e-supp/2012/16_melville.pdf (describing the require-
ments of Rule 702 in light of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions). 
77 See Grinage, 390 F.3d at 750–51; Peoples, 250 F.3d at 642; Poulin, supra note 35, at 577. 
In 2001, in United States v. Peoples, the Eighth Circuit noted that the jurors, upon learning 
of the witness’s status as an FBI agent, could be inclined to “substitute her conclusions on 
the ultimate issue of the defendants’ guilt for their own,” and concluded that this lay tes-
timony “invaded the province of the jury.” 250 F.3d at 642. 
78 See Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
79 See Fed. R. Evid. 701; Fed. R. Evid. 702; Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103–04. 
80 See Fed. R. Evid. 701; Fed. R. Evid. 702; Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1104. 
81 See Fed. R. Evid. 701; Fed. R. Evid. 702; Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1104. 
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vanaugh to testify, improperly interferes with the autonomy of the jury 
to draw its own conclusions.82 This interpretation is contrary to both 
Rule 701’s plain language, which requires that the testimony be based 
on the “witness’s perception,” and the corresponding advisory commit-
tee’s note, which indicates that a witness’ testimony must draw from 
“first-hand knowledge or observation.”83 A liberal interpretation of 
Rule 701(a) that requires no personal participation encourages wit-
nesses to speculate and opine on issues for which the witness has no 
“first-hand knowledge or observation.”84 Such testimony will not put 
“the trier of fact in possession of an accurate reproduction of the 
event.”85 Instead, the trier of fact will only possess a hybrid account of 
what the witness determined after the fact coupled with speculation.86 
Accordingly, lay witnesses should only be able to testify regarding the 
actual real-time observations they had with the subject matter, and any 
post-hoc speculation should be left to the jury.87 
 Furthermore, the court’s liberal interpretation of the 701(b) re-
quirement that testimony be “helpful to clearly understanding . . . a fact 
in issue” hinders and underestimates the capacity of the jury to draw 
conclusions from evidence.88 The court provided each juror in Jayyousi 
with a binder of each call’s transcript and each juror was able to listen 
to the corresponding call.89 After hearing the calls and reading the 
transcripts, the jurors would have achieved the exact same level of “first-
                                                                                                                      
82 See Fed. R. Evid. 701; Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103–04; United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 
201, 213–14 (2d Cir. 2005); Peoples, 250 F.3d at 641–42. 
83 See Fed. R. Evid. 701; Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1103–04; Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory com-
mittee’s note. 
84 Fed. R. Evid. 701(a) advisory committee’s note; see Fed. R. Evid. 701(a); Jayyousi, 
657 F.3d at 1102–03; United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 513–14 (5th Cir. 2011); 
United States v. Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d 1213, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007). 
85 See Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory committee’s note. 
86 See El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 513–14; Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1102–03; Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d 
at 1221. 
87 See Fed. R. Evid. 701; United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 293 (4th Cir. 2010); 
Garcia, 413 F.3d at 214–15; Peoples, 250 F.3d at 641; see also Hand, supra note 35, at 44–45 
(explaining that a witness is limited in his or her testimony only to “what hath fallen under 
his senses”). 
88 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(b); Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1125–26 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that the Eleventh Circuit, in 2002, in United States v. Cano, “concluded that a witness’s 
testimony about the meaning of facts already before the jury is inadmissible lay opinion 
specifically because the testimony ‘merely delivered a jury argument from the witness 
stand’” (quoting United States v. Cano, 289 F.3d 1354, 1363 (11th Cir. 2002))); Fed. R. 
Evid. 701(b) advisory committee’s note (stating that if “attempts are made to introduce 
meaningless assertions which amount to little more than choosing up sides, exclusion for 
lack of helpfulness is called for by the rule”). 
89 Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1122 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
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hand knowledge or observation” as Kavanaugh.90 In this way, Ka-
vanaugh had no more personal experience with these calls than the 
jury, and, therefore, he was no more qualified than the jury to specu-
late on the use of code words.91 Allowing Kavanaugh to testify on issues 
that the jury would be able to discern for themselves amounts to “little 
more than choosing up sides,” as prohibited by Rule 701(b).92 “Choos-
ing up sides” has a place in a lawyer’s closing arguments, but allowing 
lay witnesses to testify on such opinions would encourage verdicts to be 
decided on the witness stand rather than in the jury box.93 Moreover, if 
the court only accepted that Kavanaugh was more qualified to interpret 
code words given his involvement in other terrorist-related investiga-
tions, such testimony would be based on “specialized knowledge” and 
prohibited by Rule 701(c).94 
 Consequently, the Jayyousi court should have interpreted Rule 701 
according to the strictest standard.95 Only by mandating that a witness 
participated in the conversation or observed the conversation in real 
time can the court ensure that the witness’s testimony leads to an “ac-
curate reproduction of the event” that aids the jury in reaching a deci-
sion, but does not decide for it.96 
Conclusion 
 In Jayyousi, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court had not 
abused its discretion in allowing the lay opinion testimony of an FBI 
agent. In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit joined a minority of circuit 
courts in interpreting Rule 701 in its most liberal form. This interpreta-
tion allows lay witnesses to testify even when their testimony draws only 
on post-hoc review of pre-collected information. In interpreting Rule 
701 in this way, the court has failed to account for the impact such lay 
                                                                                                                      
90 See id.; Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory committee’s note. 
91 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(a); Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1122 (Barkett, J., dissenting); Grinage, 
390 F.3d at 750–51; United States v. LaPierre, 998 F.2d 1460, 1465 (9th Cir. 1993). 
92 Fed. R. Evid. 701(b) advisory committee’s note; see Fed. R. Evid. 701(b); Jayyousi, 
657 F.3d at 1125–26 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citing Cano, 289 F.3d at 1363); Fed. R. Evid. 
701 advisory committee’s note; see also Poulin, supra note 35, at 564 (“[A]n opinion is not 
helpful if it simply tells the jury what inferences to draw or summarizes the party’s case.”). 
93 Fed. R. Evid. 701(b) advisory committee’s note; see Fed. R. Evid. 701(b); Jayyousi, 
657 F.3d at 1126 (Barkett, J., dissenting); Hirst v. Inverness Hotel Corp., 544 F.3d 221, 227 
(3d Cir. 2008); Garcia, 413 F.3d at 214. 
94 See Fed. R. Evid. 701(c); Fed. R. Evid. 702; Jayyousi, 657 F.3d at 1095. 
95 See supra notes 57–67 and accompanying text; supra notes 68–94 and accompanying 
text. 
96 Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory committee’s note; see Fed. R. Evid. 701; supra notes 57–67 
and accompanying text. 
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testimony can have on the jury and has, therefore, opened the door for 
the witness stand to trump the jury box when it comes to reaching a 
verdict. Accordingly, circuit courts should adhere to a more stringent 
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